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This paper discusses computer-supported outbreak 
detection using routine surveillance data, as imple-
mented at six institutes for infectious disease control 
in five European countries. We give an overview of the 
systems used at the Statens Serum Institut (Denmark), 
Health Protection Agency (England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland), Robert Koch Institute (Germany), 
Governmental Institute of Public Health of Lower 
Saxony (Germany), National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment (the Netherlands) and Swedish 
Institute for Infectious Disease Control (Sweden). 
Despite the usefulness of the algorithms or the out-
break detection procedure itself, all institutes have 
experienced certain limitations of the systems. The 
paper therefore concludes with a list of recommenda-
tions for institutes planning to introduce computer-
supported outbreak detection, based on experiences 
on the practical usage of the systems. This list – which 
concerns usability, standard operating procedures and 
evaluation – might also inspire improvements of sys-
tems in use today.
Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of institutes for infec-
tious disease control throughout Europe have gained 
experience of systems for computer-supported out-
break detection. There are several reasons for introduc-
ing such systems to complement the daily surveillance 
already performed, mainly: (i) to detect outbreaks ear-
lier, (ii) to detect outbreaks that would probably not 
have been detected otherwise, and (iii) to highlight 
potential problematic increases in incidence of a dis-
ease in the pre-outbreak phase. 
Outbreak detection starts with the detection of an 
aberrant number of reported cases (suspected or con-
firmed) of a particular disease in a given time and 
space. Computer programs are used to compare the 
observed number of cases with expected values. When 
an increase is detected, the computer program raises 
an alert (the signal). Next, an expert (for example, an 
epidemiologist) assesses the public health relevance 
of the aberration, to determine if further investigation 
is warranted. Such investigations – which may involve 
a number of people at international, national and local 
level – are aimed at confirming whether there is an 
outbreak or not. If an outbreak is confirmed, further 
investigations will follow, where, for example, the mag-
nitude of the outbreak is assessed, the source is traced 
and control measures are suggested. The task of the 
system is thus to warn of possible outbreaks. The proc-
ess is outlined in the Figure.
Many algorithms can be used to detect deviations in 
infectious disease data, ranging from simple fixed 
thresholds to the application of complex statisti-
cal methods taking, for example, historical data into 
account (for reviews, see, for example, [1] or [2]). These 
algorithms can be applied to both laboratory data and 
clinical diagnoses as well as to syndromic surveil-
lance data. Algorithms can be used for both geospatial 
and time series data. Considerable research has been 
carried out to improve these algorithms, that is, to 
increase specificity while reducing noise. To our knowl-
edge, there are, however, no documented best prac-
tices on how to deal with the detected signals. 
As part of a Swedish national project on computer-sup-
ported outbreak detection, the Swedish Institute for 
Infectious Disease Control contacted all focal points 
in the 27 countries that had participated in the former 
Basic Surveillance Network (BSN), in September 2006. 
(BSN was a European network for sharing national 
case-based reports on infectious diseases [3], which 
constitutes the basis for the current European surveil-
lance system (TESSy) [4] maintained by the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).) 
The country contacts were asked if their institute was 
using any form of electronic outbreak detection or had 
any information on the issue. A total of 19 replies were 
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received. National institutes in the following coun-
tries had experience to share with the Swedish insti-
tute: Denmark; England, Wales and Northern Ireland; 
Germany; the Netherlands; and Norway. These coun-
tries were subsequently sent a more detailed question-
naire and a dialogue was initiated. One result of this 
dialogue was a workshop on presenting and interpret-
ing automatic outbreak detection signals, held at the 
Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, Germany, in May 2007, 
with participants from the six countries, along with 
representatives from the World Health Organization 
and ECDC. In November 2008, a second workshop was 
held, at which it was agreed that the institutes with 
computer-supported systems in place and represented 
at the meeting should share their experiences with 
institutes planning to introduce such systems. 
In this paper, we describe how six surveillance insti-
tutes in five European countries have implemented 
computer-supported outbreak detection in their rou-
tine surveillance, giving an overview of how they are 
currently used, along with the lessons learnt. We also 
provide some recommendations for institutes that 
plan to introduce similar systems. The paper does not 
describe infectious disease control in the contributing 
countries, nor is the description of the implemented 
computer-supported systems exhaustive.
Country experiences
The countries that describe their experiences of com-
puter-supported outbreak detection in this article 
vary in population size, ranging from a small country 
such as Denmark, with about 5.5 million people, to a 
large country such as Germany, with more than 82 mil-
lion. Although infectious disease control is structured 
differently in each of the five countries, there are a 
number of common experiences in using the systems 
in daily work. 
The authors describe the computer-supported out-
break detection system of their institution either as 
person in charge of the system, as the main user, or 
in collaboration with the users of the system. The per-
spective is that of the user of the system: it does not 
focus on the performance of the underlying algorithms. 
Although figures showing, for example, the sensitivity 
and positive predictive value of a particular algorithm 
applied to data collected in a particular country for a 
particular disease will reveal some information about 
its performance, there are many other aspects that 
are even more important, which are addressed in this 
paper.
Denmark
In Denmark, each week all clinical laboratories are 
required to report to a national database person-
identifiable information on cases found positive for 
pathogenic gastrointestinal bacteria. Since 2001, 
an automated outbreak detection system based on 
these data has been in use at the Statens Serum 
Institut, generally running once a week. The system 
is an implementation, made in the statistical soft-
ware SAS, of the algorithm described by Farrington 
et al. [5]. This algorithm uses Poisson regression on 
weekly counts of cases positive for each bacterial 
agent. Both national data and data from each labora-
tory’s uptake area are analysed and the possibility of 
an outbreak is expressed on a scale from one to 10 by 
the system. Results are evaluated by an epidemiolo-
gist and signals deemed relevant are communicated 
by email to the appropriate investigators or discussed 
at weekly national inter-institutional outbreak meet-
ings. In addition, surveillance and outbreak algorithm 
results for the most frequent bacterial agents have 
been published as maps, graphs and tables on a des-
ignated public website (http://www.germ.dk) on a 
weekly basis. Molecular subtyping data are not part of 
the algorithm. The algorithm has proven to be a useful 
surveillance tool, particularly for salmonella infections 
[6]. It has helped detect several outbreaks that might 
otherwise not have been noted at the time, both non-
point source (diffuse) outbreaks of disease due to rare 
serotypes and local outbreaks resulting from frequent 
serotypes.
Figure 
Process of computer-supported outbreak detection, involving both computerised and manual elements
Database for diseases:
– Number of cases 
– Date 
– Geographical information, etc.
Statistical analysis Aberration detected Signal generated
Infectious disease control 
Regional level National level
Outbreak ? Outbreak ?
Outbreak detection
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England, Wales and Northern Ireland
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland all clinical lab-
oratories are asked to electronically submit details of 
all organisms isolated to a laboratory database at the 
Centre for Infections of the Health Protection Agency 
(HPA). The information sent by the clinical laboratories 
will have come from patients within hospital depart-
ments or those attending general practices. Since 1993 
an automated algorithm, developed by Farrington et al. 
[5], has been used weekly to detect possible outbreaks 
by comparing the current week’s total reports for each 
organism with a threshold calculated using Poisson 
regression on the past five years’ data. Analyses are 
run using all regions combined and also within each 
of 11 regions, producing lists of all organisms, ranked 
according to the level of exceedance above the thresh-
old. For organisms with an exceedance (typically five to 
20 organisms per week), plots are also produced show-
ing the time series and the distribution of cases by age 
group and region or district along with an indication 
if this differs significantly from the past age group or 
regional distribution of cases. Results are posted on 
the HPA intranet and are also emailed to national and 
regional epidemiologists who further investigate the 
exceedances where necessary and initiate an outbreak 
investigation if appropriate. A weekly teleconference, 
based in the Centre for Infections, is held with national 
and regional epidemiologists to discuss any signals. 
The algorithm is currently being updated to allow data 
to be aggregated according to the date the clinical 
specimen was taken rather than date of receipt of the 
case report at the Centre for Infections. This may ena-
ble more rapid detection of outbreaks and reduce false 
signals, but it does require allowance for reporting 
delays in the model. The algorithm has enabled detec-
tion of outbreaks (particular salmonella) not otherwise 
identified, but the number of false signals and delays 
in reporting have limited its usefulness.
Germany – national level
In Germany, approximately 60 pathogens and health 
issues are reported by laboratories, general practi-
tioners or other entities to the local health authorities 
[7,8]. Detailed information about cases is entered into 
a decentralised database, anonymised and transferred 
via the state health department at the regional level 
to the national level – the Robert Koch Institute (RKI). 
The RKI runs automated outbreak detection on the case 
reports [9], using a slightly modified version of the 
algorithm described by Stroup et al. [10]. By applying 
the algorithm to subsets of the data, such as certain 
regions (Bundesland, county), age groups, sex, coun-
tries of infection, etc. it is possible to detect outbreaks 
in a population group even if the excess cases would 
be undetectable when looking at the whole population. 
Cases can be linked to electronic outbreak reports at 
the different administrative levels [8]. 
The automated outbreak detection runs weekly. The 
detected aberrations are recorded on Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets, including information on the particu-
lar subset of the data that led to the signal. A trained 
administrative clerk screens these signals and notifies 
the epidemiologist in charge when a signal subjec-
tively seems to require further action. This decision is 
based on, for example, the disease, strength of signal 
and whether or not it is related to an outbreak that has 
already been detected at the local or regional level.
In 2002, the RKI tried to visualise the alerts, with a 
graphical output. A system presented the cases and 
incidence for each disease at each administrative level 
in charts and maps, including the possibility of show-
ing the place of residence of the affected cases [11]. The 
main advantage of that system was that the user could 
label a signal as handled, avoiding repeated presenta-
tion of the same signal when running the algorithms 
daily. Unfortunately, the implementation of the surveil-
lance system’s front end did not easily allow for such 
an extension and this tool was therefore developed as 
an independent application. This lack of integration 
negatively influenced the usability and the tool was 
never incorporated into the regular surveillance.
Germany – Lower Saxony
At the governmental institute of public health in the 
German Land of Lower Saxony (NLGA), a system for 
automated outbreak detection has been developed 
with freeware tools. The starting point is case counts 
aggregated by disease (for salmonellosis, also by 
serotype of the causative agent), week of notification 
and 46 administrative districts. The data are exported 
weekly from the case database at the NLGA [7]. The 
following statistical methods (and corresponding soft-
ware) are applied: detection of clusters in time by the 
method of Stroup et al. [10] and the method developed 
by Farrington et al. [5], as implemented in the R pack-
age surveillance [12], as well as detection of spatial 
clusters by SaTScan spatial scan statistics [13]. Data are 
also visualised on a website through time series charts 
using R software and maps (EpiMap) [14]. Validation of 
the signals since 2002 suggests that attention should 
be focused on highly significant signals (p<0.01). The 
results vary widely between diseases due to their dif-
ferent epidemiological characteristics. Spatial cluster-
signals are frequently caused by diagnostic effects, for 
instance, by a tuberculosis screening programme in an 
immigration centre [15] or by specific awareness for 
Cryptosporidium parvum in a regional laboratory [16]. 
The methods are primarily valuable for noticing case 
clusters at an early stage. However, the initial suspi-
cion or even detection of the clusters has often already 
occurred elsewhere – for example, at a local public 
health department or in a laboratory. Besides cluster 
identification, the statistically justified cluster signals 
have been proven to be helpful for communication pur-
poses and decision support. 
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, for notifiable diseases (except 
salmonella and campylobacter infections) the simple 
model of Stroup et al. [10] has been used at the National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) 
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since 1998. Laboratory surveillance, however, is vol-
untary and based on a sentinel of clinical laboratories 
that has been difficult to sustain. At RIVM, the algo-
rithm developed by Farrington et al. [5] was imple-
mented and in use from 2002 to 2006 for 34 pathogens 
[17], and from 1996 to date for more than 700 salmo-
nella serotypes and phagetypes on a weekly basis. 
Observed, expected and tolerance levels are presented 
as time series that can be visually inspected retrospec-
tively; observed frequencies are flagged if above the 
defined level of tolerance. A one- and a four-week win-
dow is used and a weekly window is run day by day, 
to improve sensitivity [17]. For salmonellosis, a website 
is available on the RIVM intranet, showing the period 
above tolerance levels and if cases are significantly 
clustered in space or demographically deviating from 
expected results. Maps are automatically generated 
each week for significant clusters. Out of hundreds of 
pathogens and serotypes analysed, the system draws 
attention to those signals that need further investiga-
tion and aids in the first steps of signal verification. 
Results are evaluated by an epidemiologist and signals 
deemed relevant are communicated by email and dis-
cussed weekly together with other signals, to decide 
upon further action [18]. Attention has been drawn to 
numerous small and large outbreaks in the past 10 
years of using this system of algorithms and presenta-
tion of underlying information [19].
Sweden
The Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control 
has implemented a framework for computer-supported 
outbreak detection, called Computer Assisted Search 
for Epidemics (CASE) [20]. The source code for the 
framework is available as open source, licensed under 
the General Public License GPLv3 [21]. There is no limit 
set to the number of statistical algorithms that the 
CASE framework can support, and one or more algo-
rithms can be applied to each disease. In addition, 
the parameter settings for each algorithm can be dif-
ferent for different diseases, even for different types 
if required. When an aberration is detected, an email 
is sent to the people listed for the particular disease, 
such as the epidemiologist in charge of that disease. 
The database behind CASE is populated with disease, 
disease agent type (when available) and regional infor-
mation (county code), and the date when a case was 
first entered in the database. Two SaTScan algorithms 
[13,22] are fully integrated in the system, as are the 
algorithm described by Farrington et al. [5], as imple-
mented in [12], and OutbreakP, which is used to inves-
tigate if an increase in the number of cases is more 
than expected, thus implying a potential outbreak [23]. 
In addition, a simple threshold can be set, where the 
number of reported cases is not to exceed a manually 
predefined value. Specified parts of the output gener-
ated by the algorithms are automatically extracted and 
processed further – for example, a signal is conveyed 
to the person responsible for the surveillance of the 
disease in question only if it occurred during the two 
preceding weeks. The system is implemented for all 62 
notifiable diseases in Sweden. The algorithms are still 
being fine-tuned to suit the diseases, in order to find 
a reasonable balance between false alarms and not 
missing true outbreaks.
Recommendations 
Drawing on everyday experience with computer-
supported outbreak detection from all the institutes 
represented in this paper, we present a number of rec-
ommendations. These recommendations, summarised 
in the checklist (Box), should be valuable not only to 
countries wishing to implement their own system, but 
also to those that already have such a system in place. 
On the basis of practical experience, we consider that 
complying with these recommendations is a prerequi-
site for an optimally functioning computer-supported 
outbreak detection system. 
Box
Checklist for a computer-supported outbreak detection 
system
•	  Signals and alerts are presented in a way that works well 
for the receivers. 
•	  The output is user friendly, preferably in a graphical 
format (maps, epidemic curves etc.). 
•	  People in charge of the surveillance of a particular 
disease can obtain signals for only that 
disease. 
•	  The system is tightly integrated with the database, 
giving easy access to the case reports that contributed 
to the signals.  
•	  Feedback from the receivers of the alerts is continuously 
incorporated into the system. 
•	  Feedback to the public health workers at the local level, 
laboratories, etc. is part of the process. 
•	  Outbreak algorithms can be scheduled as needed, e.g. 
daily or at least weekly, as well as run on an ad hoc 
basis. 
•	  Algorithms can be fine-tuned easily and can also be 
applied to subsets of the data. 
•	  Routines are in place for assessing if follow-up of a 
signal is needed. 
•	  Routines are well documented, including vacation 
replacement strategies. 
•	  Evaluation strategy is defined and regular evaluations 
are scheduled.  
•	  The system supports logging of judgements of the 
detected signals to allow for future analysis and 
improvement of the algorithms. 
•	  System-generated alerts can be linked to reported 
outbreaks. 
•	  Signals presented once can be suppressed by the user 
until a second threshold is crossed. 
•	  Sufficient support and maintenance of the hardware and 
software is provided. Also routines for user support and 
maintenance of software and hardware are documented.
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Usability
Well-functioning computerised outbreak detection 
should be able to detect outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases, to notify the people in charge of the surveil-
lance and possibly also to reduce the workload of 
those working in outbreak detection. It is therefore 
crucial to not only improve the algorithms but to give 
the users the tools they need – that is, to find a suit-
able way to present the signals, which works for the 
receiver (for example, showing an epidemic curve of 
the cases contributing to the signal, visualising the 
expected maximum number or threshold, and show-
ing a map that displays the regional distribution of the 
cases). The outbreak alert system should be tightly 
integrated with the surveillance database and allow 
the user easy access to the case reports that contrib-
uted to the signal. In addition, system-generated alerts 
can be linked to reported outbreaks. When the system 
is run frequently – which is critical for timely outbreak 
detection – users might receive the same signal sev-
eral times. It is therefore important to allow the users 
to suppress signals presented until a second threshold 
is crossed. Acceptance of the system can increase if 
the signals can be filtered according to disease, so that 
those in charge of a particular disease receive signals 
for that disease only. Signals generated on other dis-
eases are then not visible to them. It should be possi-
ble to schedule the algorithms as needed, for example, 
daily or at least weekly, as well as to run them on an 
ad hoc basis.
Some outbreaks affect only a certain risk group, mean-
ing that the number of cases is so low that the excess 
cases cannot be detected automatically. It is therefore 
recommended to look at subsets of the data, such 
as regions, age groups and sex. Regional clustering 
together with time is extremely useful. In particular 
this may compensate for the lack of typing detail for 
frequently reported pathogens such as campylobacter. 
Changes in the system, such as new reporting labora-
tories, new test methods, etc., can significantly affect 
the performance of the algorithms and have to be care-
fully taken into account.
Standard operating procedures
The value of computerised outbreak detection is low if 
it is used only occasionally and if it is not embedded 
in standard operating procedures (SOPs) that clearly 
state the procedures for both the assessment of the 
signals and the actions to be taken if a detected out-
break is considered to pose a risk to the public. These 
SOPs should include feedback to the local level, the 
laboratories, etc. They should also handle more techni-
cal aspects, such as user support and maintenance of 
software and hardware.
Evaluation
We strongly recommend regular evaluation of the com-
puterised outbreak detection system. This evaluation 
should include, for example, the system’s usefulness 
and acceptance and should not be restricted to the per-
formance of the algorithms used. To assess specificity, 
it would be helpful to log the experts’ judgements of 
the detected signals, whether the signal indicates a 
real outbreak or it should be considered a false alarm. 
Information on outbreaks detected by more traditional 
means, such as by people in laboratories or at local 
health authorities, can be used to assess the sensitiv-
ity and timeliness of the algorithms. 
Other aspects of a computerised system, such as report 
generation and presentation and visualisation of the 
data related to an outbreak, should also be evaluated. 
Discussion
The different algorithms described in this paper have 
shown their ability to detect outbreaks that without 
their application would have been detected later or 
maybe even remained unnoticed. However, despite the 
obvious usefulness of the algorithms or the outbreak 
detection procedure itself, all countries have experi-
enced certain limitations of the systems. 
At all six institutes, the electronic systems are a central 
part of the outbreak detection process. The output is 
used in several complementary ways, and signals can 
often raise awareness among the people in charge of 
disease surveillance. The signals are either sent auto-
matically from the system directly to a wider audience, 
or may already be filtered by a trained administrative 
clerk or an epidemiologist before being disseminated 
for further assessment. Tables, charts and maps, as 
well as results of statistical analyses by the outbreak 
detection algorithms are used to aid the assessment of 
the relevance of a signal. In addition, contextual infor-
mation might be needed from other departments, for 
example, agricultural and census data. In several of the 
countries, the output of the system is also published 
on internal or public websites, allowing information to 
be shared with a broader audience as well as feedback 
to be given to the information provider. 
By using a computerised system, it is possible to ana-
lyse data at various aggregation levels (e.g. different 
administrative levels) as well as data on different sub-
sets of the population (e.g. by sex and age group). In 
addition, hundreds of pathogens can be analysed in 
a short period of time. The use of different outbreak 
detection methods, ranging from simple thresholds to 
complex statistical algorithms, in combination with the 
possibility of fine-tuning the system over time means 
that the system can be adapted according to different 
disease patterns. Running the algorithms on hundreds 
of pathogens and on different population subsets is, 
however, likely to pose a problem of many false alerts, 
which can reduce the usefulness of a computerised 
system. Although fine-tuning the system over time 
might reduce the problem, sufficient human resources 
are needed to deal with the generated alerts.
It has been noted by the users of the systems described 
that automatically detected disease clusters frequently 
have been observed at the same time or even earlier by 
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someone else, for example, by a laboratory. In such a 
case, the role of the system is rather that of providing 
further evidence and acting as a complement to the tra-
ditional surveillance. However, several countries also 
report that outbreaks that would otherwise have been 
missed have been detected by the computerised sys-
tems (for references, see for example [9]).
We consider that following the recommendations pre-
sented in this paper is a prerequisite for an optimally 
functioning computer-supported outbreak detection 
system. In so doing, a system that is user-friendly and 
supports a complex epidemiological reality may be 
obtained.
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